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CASE COMMENTS
Taxation -"Section 306 Stock"
Taxpayer, Eugene Fireoved,' incorporated Fireoved and Com-
pany, Inc., in 1948. He controlled Fireoved by virtue of his owner-
ship of all one hundred shares of the corporation's voting common
stock. Taxpayer also owned sixty-five shares of preferred stock. In
1954, Girard Business Forms, a two-man partnership owned by Karl
Edelmayer and Kenneth Craver, was merged with taxpayer's corpora-
tion, and the new corporation adopted the name Girard Business
Forms. The amount of voting common stock was increased from one
hundred to three hundred shares, with Edelmayer and Craver each
receiving one hundred shares to provide for equal voting power. In
addition, the corporate by-laws were amended to require unanimous
consent of the directors for corporate action and a vote of seventy-six
percent of the outstanding common stock or unanimous consent of
the directors to amend the by-laws. Non-voting preferred stock was
issued to reflect the capital investment of each man. Since the tax-
payer's corporation had a net worth of approximately $60,000, the
taxpayer was granted a stock dividend of 535 shares of preferred
stock. This dividend, when added to the sixty-five preferred shares he
already owned, gave him six hundred non-voting preferred shares
worth $60,000. In 1958, the taxpayer sold twenty-four percent of his
common stock to Edelmayer. This transaction left the taxpayer with
251/3 percent of the corporation's outstanding stock, enough to main-
tain his position on the board of directors and to prevent amendment
of the by-laws without his consent. In 1959, the company redeemed
451 of the taxpayer's 600 preferred shares at $105 each. The Com-
missioner, pursuant to section 306 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954,2 assessed a deficiency against the taxpayer, contending that the
proceeds from the redemption should have been reported as ordinary
I Taxpayer's wife was included in the suit only because they filed a joint
federal income tax return.
2 B. BnTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INcoME TAX&TION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS t 10.02 (3d ed. 1971).
[Section 306 of the 1954 Code creates] a new category of stock
-"section 306 stock" - whose sale or other disposition will usually
give rise to ordinary income rather than capital gain. Section 306
consists of (a) a definition of "section 306 stock"; (b) a set of rules
providing that the sale or other disposition of "section 306 stock" will
produce ordinary income rather than capital gain; and (c) a series
of exceptions to these punitive rules.
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income.3 Taxpayer paid the assessment and filed for a refund, which
the Commissioner denied. Taxpayer then instituted suit in federal
district court. The district court found that the 535 shares of preferred
stock issued to taxpayer as a dividend were "section 306 stock" and
proceeds therefrom were taxable as ordinary income. The court held,
however, that twenty-four percent of the stock should not be taxed as
"section 306 stock" because twenty-four percent of its underlying
common stock had been sold prior to the redemption. 4 Both parties
appealed this decision. Held, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. The 535 shares of preferred stock were "section 306
stock," and any proceeds realized therefrom were taxable as ordinary
income. The sale of twenty-four percent of taxpayer's common stock
prior to redemption did not remove the "section 306 stock taint"
from twenty-four percent of the preferred stock. Fireoved v. United
States, 462 F.2d 1281 (3d Cir. 1972).
The device by which the taxpayer attempted to withdraw the
accumulated earnings and profits from his company as capital gains is
known as a "preferred stock bailout." If a corporation distributes cash
dividends, the dividends will be taxed as ordinary income. However,
prior to enactment of section 306, if a corporation made a tax-free
distribution of preferred stock, the shareholders could sell their stock
and treat the proceeds as capital gain. Since the preferred stock nor-
mally had no voting power, the shareholders could in effect withdraw
the corporate earnings and profits at capital gain rates without diluting
their control of the corporation. The classic example of a "preferred
stock bailout" is Chamberlin v. Commissioner.- In Chamberlin, a
closely held corporation had assets of about $2.5 million of which
approximately $1.3 million were in cash and United States Govern-
ment securities. The corporation declared a tax-free stock dividend of
1V shares of newly authorized preferred stock for each outstanding
common share. Subsequently, the shareholders sold their dividend
shares to an insurance company pursuant to an agreement negotiated
3The entire amount realized from the redemption of "section 306 stock"
is treated as receipt of a dividend. Fireoved and Company, Inc., redeemed 451
shares of "306 stock." The "306 stock" had a basis of $100 per share and was
redeemed at $105 per share by the company. The total receipt from the re-
demption was $47,355, which was an increase of $2,255 over the stock's basis
of $45,100. Under section 306, however, the entire amount realized from the
redemption, not just the gain above the basis, is taxed as a dividend under
sections 301 and 316. Therefore, the tax deficiency was calculated with respect
to the entire $47,355 received. [References are to Int. Rev. Code of 1954 un-
less otherwise noted.]
4318 F. Supp. 133 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
5 207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953).
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before the stock dividend was declared. The taxpayers treated the
gain from this sale as capital gain. The Commissioner treated it as
ordinary income. The tax court agreed with the Commissioner.6 The
circuit court reversed,7 and certiorari was denied by the Supreme
Court.8 This presented the danger that all a taxpayer had to do to
avoid having a dividend taxed as ordinary income was to get the
dividend in stock and then sell it.
When Chamberlin was decided, Congress was in the process of
drafting the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. In response it enacted
section 306, which is designed to prevent the "preferred stock bail-
out." Section 306 creates a new type of stock, the proceeds from
which are treated as ordinary income. Section 306(c) (1) defines
"306 stock" as stock falling into one of three categories: (1) tax free
share dividend stock, other than common stock, issued with respect
to common stock; (2) stock received tax free in a corporate re-
organization or separation which has the effect of a stock dividend;
and (3) stock deriving its basis from "306 stock."9 By the enactment
of section 306, the type of transaction that occurred in Chamberlin
was stripped of its tax advantages. The entire amount realized from
the sale of the stock is taxable as ordinary income.
Congress, however, realized that section 306 might produce hard-
ships on individuals who were not using preferred stock as a tax
avoidance device.'0 In an effort to prevent such hardships, Congress
created exceptions in sections 306(b)", and 306(c) (2)12 of the Code.
6 18 T.C. 164 (1952).
7 207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953).
8 347 U.S. 918 (1954).
9 Alexander & Landis, Bailouts and the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
65 Yale LJ. 909, 917-39 (1956). See Treas. Reg. § 1.306-3 (1960); B. Birr-
xER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS (t 10.03 (3d ed. 1971).
10 Alexander & Landis, supra note 9, at 915-16.
11 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 306(b), provides:
Exceptions. - Subsection (a) shall not apply-
(1) Termination of shareholder's interest.-
(A) Not in redemption. - If the disposition-
(i) is not a redemption;(ii) is not, directly or indirectly, to a person the ownership
of whose stock would (under section 318(a)) be attributable to
the shareholder; and
(iii) terminates the entire stock interest of the shareholder
in the corporation (and for purposes of this clause, section
318(a) shall apply).
(B) In redemption. - If the disposition is a redemption and sec-
tion 302(b)(3) applies.
(4) Transactions not in avoidance. - If it is established to the
satisfaction of the Secretary or his delegate -
[Vol. 75
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Section 306(b) (4), an important exception, removes the penalty for
transactions that are not part of a plan primarily designed to avoid
federal income tax.'3 Section 306(b) (4) (B) indicates that in the
event of a prior or simultaneous disposition or redemption of the
underlying common stock with respect to which the "section 306
stock" was issued, the disposition of "section 306 stock" will not be
considered as part of a plan, a principal purpose of which was to
avoid the federal income tax. 4 In the regulations, the Commissioner
agrees that if the provisions of section 306(b) (4) (B) are satisfied,
then proof that the disposition was not in pursuance of a plan to
avoid federal income tax is unnecessary.' 5
In Fireoved, the taxpayer claimed that the sale of twenty-four
percent of the common stock underlying his preferred stock should,
pursuant to section 306(b) (4) (B), remove the "taint" from twenty-
four percent of his preferred stock and allow the taxpayer to treat dis-
position of those shares as capital gain. The Commissioner contended
that section 306(b) (4) (B) only applied to cases where the share-
holder disposed of all his underlying common stock before disposing of
his "section 306 stock."' 6 The district court, agreeing with the tax-
payer, reasoned that the exception granted in section 306(b) (4) could
not be isolated from the other exceptions granted under section
306(b). 7 In particular, section 306(b) (1) grants an exception if the
(A) that the distribution, and the disposition or redemption, or(B) in the case of a prior or simultaneous disposition (or re-demption) of the stock with respect to which the section 306 stock
disposed of (or redeemed) was issued, that the disposition (or re-demption) of the section 306 stock,
was not in pursuance of a plan having as one of its principal pur-
poses the avoidance of Federal income tax.
12 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 306(c) (2), provides:
Exception where no earnings and profits. - For purposes of this
section, the term "section 306 stock" does not include any stock nopart of the distribution of which would have been a dividend at the
time of the distribution if money had been distributed in lieu of the
stock.
13For the text of INr. REv. CODE of 1954, § 306(b) (4), see note 11.
14For the text of INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 306(b)(4)(B), see note 11.
IsTreas. Reg. § 1.306-2(b)(3) (1968), in pertinent part provides:
However, in the case of a prior or simultaneous disposition (or
redemption) of the stock with respect to which the section 306 stock
disposed of (or redeemed) was issued, it is not necessary to establish
that the distribution was not in pursuance of such a plan.... [I]f a
shareholder received a distribution of 100 shares of section 306 stock
on his holdings of 100 shares of voting common stock in a corpora-
tion and sells his voting common stock before he disposes of his sec-tion 306 stock, the subsequent disposition of his section 306 stock
would not ordinarily be considered a disposition one of the principal
purposes of which is the avoidance of Federal income tax.16318 F. Supp. 144.
171d. at 143-45.
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transaction terminates the shareholder's entire stock interest in the cor-
poration."8 The district court concluded that to require a taxpayer to
part with all of his common stock in order to qualify under section
306(b) (4) (B) would render the section meaningless because section
306(b) (1) covers this contingency.' 9 Consequently, the district court
allowed the taxpayer to treat twenty-four percent of the proceeds on
the redemption of the preferred stock as capital gain.20 The district
court considered ownership of the underlying common stock to be
the crucial test for the exception.
The district court's holding that section 306(b)(4)(B) would
be rendered meaningless by the adoption of the Commissioner's posi-
tion is not an easy one to understand. Section 306(b) (1) does not, in
all cases, apply to a taxpayer who disposes of all his underlying com-
mon stock. In the instant case, for example, if the taxpayer had dis-
posed of all his common stock before the company redeemed 451
shares of his preferred stock, he would have qualified for an exception
to section 306 treatment by satisfying section 306(b) (4) (B). How-
ever, the taxpayer would not have qualified for an exception under
section 306(b) (1) because he still owned 149 shares of preferred
stock; he had not terminated his entire stock interest in the corpora-
tion as required by section 306(b) (1).
The circuit court looked beneath the ownership of the common
stock to the realities of control in the corporation.21 When the com-
pany was merged with Girard Business Forms, the corporate by-laws
were amended to require unanimous consent of the directors for cor-
porate action and a vote of seventy-six percent of the outstanding
common stock or a unanimous vote of the directors to amend the
by-laws.2 2 As previously noted, the taxpayer retained 25 / percent of
the outstanding common stock after his sale to Edelmayer; he retained
an effective veto power over corporate activities. The circuit court
concluded that to except the taxpayer from section 306 treatment
would be unrealistic where the taxpayer had disposed of only a por-
tion of the underlying common stock and had retained the same basic
control over the corporation.23 The circuit court considered control
18 For the text of INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 306(b)(1), see note 11.
19 318 F. Supp. at 144.
20 Id.
21 462 F.2d at 1288-90.
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of the corporation to be a major factor in qualifying for the excep-
tion.
Both the circuit and district courts relied upon the Senate Report
on section 306(b) (4) (B) for support.24 In the discussion of that sec-
tion, the report used as an example a taxpayer who had disposed of
his entire voting common stock before disposing of his "section 306
stock." The report concluded that the transaction was not treated as
a tax avoidance disposition since the taxpayer had parted with the
stock that allowed him to participate in the ownership of the busi-
ness. 2 This appears to bolster the district court's holding that owner-
ship, not control, is the basis for the exception. The report cautioned,
however, that variations of its example may not be within the ex-
ception. To illustrate this, it hypothesized a case in which a corporation
had only one class of common stock with respect to which it issued
section "306 stock." Subsequently, to take advantage of section
306(b) (4) (B), the corporation issued a new class of common stock
with greater voting rights than the first class and then disposed of all
of its first class of common, as well as its "section 306 stock," retain-
ing the second class of common stock. The Senate concluded that
even though the stock underlying the "306 stock" was disposed of,
the "306 stock" could not qualify for an exception from section 306
treatment.26 This supports the circuit court's contention that control
is the key since, in this example, the taxpayer tried to avoid taxes
while maintaining control of the company. The circuit court's inter-
pretation seems logical. If the purpose of a bailout is to withdraw
profits at the capital gain rates while maintaining corporate control,
and the purpose of section 306 is to negate the use of this device,
then it is reasonable to assume that the Senate constructed its
hypothetical case to emphasize the importance of corporate control.
Ignoring corporate control might lead to abuses that section 306 was
designed to prevent. Assume that a closely held corporation is or-
ganized to insure that each director will have a veto power over
corporate activities. Assume further that: (1) These directors are
elected by different classes of common stock and the taxpayer is the
sole owner of one hundred shares of a class of stock that has the
right to elect one director; and (2) taxpayer is in financial trouble.
The other directors, in order to keep his services, agree to issue
241d.; 318 F. Supp. at 144-45.25S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 244 (1954).
26Id.
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preferred stock with respect to his class of common stock and to
redeem every share of his preferred as well as ninety-nine shares of
his common stock. Taxpayer would still retain a veto power over
corporate activities by his ability to elect a director with his remaining
one share of common stock. Under the district court's ruling, ninety-
nine percent of the gain from the redeemed preferred stock would be
taxed as capital gain.27 The circuit court's analysis would require
taxation of all the proceeds as ordinary income. It appears that the
circuit court's opinion is more consistent with the purpose of section
306, which is the elimination of the "preferred stock bailout."
Only the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has decided
this question. Speculation about future litigation in this area is tenuous.
If a taxpayer disposes of his entire voting stock, he will not normally
be taxed at ordinary rates on his "section 306 stock." If he disposes of
only a portion and retains essentially the same control over the cor-
poration, he will run afoul of the Third Circuit's ruling. The Third
Circuit's holding that control is an important factor in granting excep-
tions to section 306 treatment under section 306(b) (4) (B) seems
reasonable and should be followed. However, the Third Circuit's
opinion does not decide the status of a taxpayer who, in giving up a
portion of his voting stock, relinquishes effective control of the
corporation.28 There exists the possibility that the Third Circuit would
allow a proportionate reduction under those circumstances. Still, a
taxpayer should proceed with caution if he wishes to dispose of "306
stock" without first disposing of his entire voting stock upon which
the "306 stock" is based; the Commissioner has embraced the position
that a complete divesture of voting stock is necessary to qualify one
for an exception to section 306 under section 306(b) (4) (B).
Edward G. Kennedy
27 Note, however, that it still might be taxable under sections 301 and 302
as essentially equivalent to a dividend.28462 F.2d at 1290 n.14. The circuit court limited its decision to the facts
and specifically disclaimed any view on the situation where a taxpayer disposes
of only a portion of the underlying stock while relinquishing effective control
of the corporation prior to the disposition of "section 306 stock."
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